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Zeno’s Paradoxes
Chris Mortensen
In this paper I will describe seven paradoxes, due to Zeno of Elea. I will show 
that they contain subtle arguments, not easily brushed aside. Resolution of the 
paradoxes in several cases requires nineteenth-century mathematics, which neither 
Zeno nor his contemporaries could have contemplated. In two cases, I will contend 
that the paradoxes are not solved even today. 
1. Introduction
Zeno of Elea invented several paradoxes which are justly famous. Th ey amount 
to interesting and plausible arguments for obviously false conclusions. Th is is the 
characteristic of a good paradox: it promises to be interesting and instructive. 
To say that Zeno’s arguments are plausible, is to say that it is not easy to describe 
where they go wrong in yielding absurd conclusions. Th is is a typical situation 
in philosophy! It leads us to re-examine what we imagined was absurd. Oft en we 
conclude that there was a core of truth in both positions, though uncovering those 
truths can be diffi  cult. 
In this paper, I am more interested in the paradoxes as being worthy of philo-
sophical interrogation, than I am in historical detail. Th at is, I am more interested 
in what we can learn from them when we put the arguments in their strongest 
form, and less interested in what Zeno himself thought he was doing with them. 
Th at is another mark of a fecund idea: one which leads to later developments and 
distinctions. I aim to justify the great Bertrand Russell’s 1937 judgement of Zeno:
Having invented four arguments, all immeasurably subtle and profound, the grossness 
of subsequent philosophers pronounced him to be a mere ingenious juggler, and his 
arguments to be one and all sophisms (Russell, 1937:347).
Zeno (b.  around 490 BCE) was a member of the Eleatic school. In this, he followed 
the view of Parmenides, who argued that all is one. In so doing he felt he had also 
to deny change. Zeno devised his paradoxes to support this position, and argued 
that our natural view, that there are such things as motion and spatial extension, is 
mistaken. Th at is, Zeno agreed with the conclusions of these paradoxes. But I said 
Mortensen, Chris. 2007. Zeno's Paradoxes. In E. Close, M. Tsianikas and G. Couvalis (eds.) "Greek Research in Australia: 
Proceedings of the Sixth Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University June 2005", Flinders University 
Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 11-18.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
CHRIS MORTENSEN
12
earlier that these conclusions are absurd. Th at is the modern view. Nonetheless, as 
we will see, it takes at least nineteenth century mathematics to see the fallacies in 
Zeno’s arguments, so his arguments can be said to have survived 2,500 years and 
led to some very interesting insights. And even then, one (Th e Arrow) remains 
troublesome today. 
Zeno’s paradoxes are variously numbered from four to forty. What explains 
this diff erence is that diff erent classifi cations follow from diff erent theoretical as-
sessments of what is signifi cant in each. I will classify them in my own way. I fi nd 
seven, in three groups. 
2. Th e Paradox of Plurality or Spatial Extension
If a thing had size, it would be many (because it would be spatially divisible). So, 
since there must be unity somewhere, things with size must be ultimately com-
posed of things that have no size. But then, if existing things were composed of 
things that have no size, then the composite things can have no size either (because 
adding together things with no size cannot amount to having a non-zero size). 
3. Four Paradoxes of Motion
3A: Th e Race Track I (also known as Th e Stadium). To move from place A to place B, 
one would have to move fi rst half way between the two, then complete the journey. 
But to move to the half way point, one must fi rst get to the quarter way point, and 
so on. Th us, to move from A to B one must 
complete an infi nite number of distinct tasks, 
and an infi nite number of distinct tasks can-
not be completed in a fi nite time. Th us motion 
is contradictory and impossible. 
3B: Achilles and the Tortoise. Achilles races 
the tortoise, and gives it a start. For Achilles to 
catch the tortoise, he runs fi rst to where the 
tortoise starts from. Th e tortoise has moved 
on. Achilles continues to run to where the tor-
toise has moved to, but again the tortoi se has 
moved on a little. Evidently, to catch the tor-
toise one must complete an infi nite number 
of tasks, and as before one cannot do that in 
a fi nite time. Hence, Achilles cannot catch the 
tortoise. 
3C: Th e Race Track II. Imagine three bod-
ies broken down into their atomic parts, one 
body motionless, the others tracking past it in Zeno of Elea (490?–430? BC).
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opposite directions at the same speed. Th e time taken for each of the moving bodies 
to go from one point to its adjacent point is fi xed. Th e time taken for a given point 
on one moving body to pass one on the other moving body is half that time, but that 
is impossible because there is no such thing as half an instant. 
3D: Th e Arrow. An arrow in fl ight is in the place that it is in. But that is indistin-
guishable from the arrow being motionless. (Freeze-frame the arrow at any in-
stant: it is motionless). How can a number of motionless things add up to motion? 
Th us, the arrow is at rest. 
4. Miscellaneous: Two Paradoxes
4A: Place. Suppose that existing things exist in space. Th at is, suppose that space 
exists and it is what gives things their place: the place a thing is in, is defi ned as the 
spatial point at which it exists. But then, since space exists, place exists. And since 
whatever exists, exists at a place, it follows that place must be in a place also. Th us, 
place is in a place is in a place, ad infi nitum. 
4B: Th e Millet Seed. We tip a bushel of millet seed onto the ground, and we hear a 
loud sound. Tip a single millet seed onto the ground, it makes no sound. How can 
the whole bushel make a sound, since a large number of no-sounds cannot amount 
to any sound. 
5. Comments on the Paradoxes: Plurality or Spatial Extension
A thorough discussion of all these paradoxes would take a lot more than can be 
fi tted in here. Th e well-known philosopher of science Adolf Grunbaum (1967) 
devoted a book to it. Nonetheless, there are a number of interesting principles we 
can derive from some of these paradoxes. I begin with Spatial Extension (plural-
ity). Th e fi rst principle that it depends on is:
Principle 1
Any thing with (non-zero) size is di vi sible into (non-overlapping) parts which are 
of smaller (non-zero) size. Th e size of the whole is the sum of the sizes of those 
parts. 
Th is is a natural principle. But we must allow that it might be false, that is that 
spa ce might be quantized or granular. By this I mean that  space might consist of 
atoms of space, which have a least non-zero size, and are indivisible into anything 
shorter. Th is pos sibility  has certainly been countenanced. But notice that the argu-
ment does not depend on things being actually divisible, only being divisible in 
thought. Th en Zeno’s argument can be put through. 
Nonetheless, we can sidestep this prob lem by asking whether as a matter of fact 
space is infi nitely divisible, or alternative ly quantized. It might be thought that the 
quantum theory demonstrates that space itself is quantized into minimum non-
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zero distances. Th e answer is no. Without going into technicality, it is only for 
certain quantum systems that there is quantization of any quantity. For the gen-
eral case, the answer is no: quantum mechanics has written into it the assumption 
that space and time are continuous and infi nitely divisible. Interested readers may 
consult Grunbaum (1967:109–114).
Th us, I endorse Principle 1. We can then say that this step in Zeno’s argument is 
justifi ed. But we can also say that if space were quantized then this step in Zeno’s 
argument would be blocked, so that motion in quantized space would still be 
possible. However, we see later, particularly with Th e Race Track II, that there are 
other paradoxes that pose problems for quantized space. 
Th e second principle which Zeno’s argument depends on is: 
Principle 2
Ultimately, division leads to atomic parts (parts that have no proper parts them-
selves). Atomic parts have no size. Th at is, all things are composed of things with-
out size. 
I endorse this principle also, for similar reasons to those just given for Princi-
ple 1. One might argue that if atomic parts had size, they would have proper parts 
(parts of a lesser size). But in any case, points of space are generally said in both 
quantum theory and relativity theory to have no size. 
Th e third principle we can learn, and which I will endorse, is one which Zeno 
must deny. 
Principle 3
It is possible for something having a (non-zero) size to be composed of an infi nite 
number of things having no size. 
As is apparent, it is Zeno’s presupposition that this is false, which leads to the 
paradox. We can thus learn from the truth of Principle 3. It is allowed by vari-
ous nineteenth- and twentieth-century mathematical theories of size or distance 
(metric spaces, measure theory, Riemannian spaces). Perhaps the simplest of these 
is the theory of metric spaces. To sketch it briefl y, a metric or distance function is a 
function d(X,Y) between all the pairs of points X and Y in a space satisfying:
(1) d(X,Y) ≥ 0
(2) d(X,Y) = 0 iff  X=Y
(3) d(X,Y) + d(Y,Z) ≥ d(X,Z)
Th is shows that the theory of size or distance postulates that distance is a relation 
between pairs of points in a space. It is not something that somehow accumula tes 
from the absolute size of single points in the space. It follows that we have every 
reason to affi  rm Principle 3, and every reason to reject Zenos’ move in this paradox: 
modern mathematics affi  rms Principle 3 also. Th us, as far as Zeno’s argument goes, 
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motion remains possible. Zeno’s argument is erroneous. But it took over two mil-
lennia for that to be clarifi ed by modern mathematics. 
6. Two Paradoxes of Motion
Th e fi rst two paradoxes, namely Th e Race Track I and Achilles and the Tortoise, 
depend on the premiss that one cannot complete an infi nite number of (non-
overlapping) tasks in a fi nite time. Notice that if one did not have to complete an 
infi nite number of tasks, but only a fi nite number as would be the case if space 
were quantized, then there would be no paradox. Th us these paradoxes are di-
rected at showing that motion in a continuous infi nitely-divisible space is impos-
sible. However, as we have already seen, the assumption that space is continuous is 
a reasonable one, supported by twentieth-century physics. Th e signifi cant lesson 
to be learned from these premisses is therefore diff erent. It is the denial of Zeno’s 
fi rst premiss, namely:
Principle 4
It is possible to complete an infi nite number of tasks in a fi nite time. 
Th e simplest way to see that completing an infi nite number of distinct tasks 
in a fi nite time is possible, is to note that in any motion at all, I traverse an infi -
nite number of positions in space (all the points between starting and stopping). 
But perhaps that smacks too much of question-begging, since aft er all Zeno was 
trying to prove that motion in a continuous space is impossible. A more realistic 
justifi  cation of Principle 4 is familiar to us from modern algebra: infi nite sums of 
non-zero quantities can be fi nite. For example, it is well-known that 1/2 + ¼ + 1/8 
+ ... + 1/2n + ... =1. But the terms on the left  hand side exactly parallel the tasks 
required in our two paradoxes. Th is shows that the two paradoxes, in relying on 
the idea that an infi nite number of tasks cannot be completed in a fi nite time, are 
fallacious. 
7. Th e Race Track II
Th e third paradox of motion has a diff erent lesson to be learnt. In its simplest 
terms, it is an attack on quantized or discrete time. Imagine two series of moving 
bodies passing one another in discrete time. At time t=1, point 1 on body 1 is 
opposite point 1 on body 2. At the next instant t=2, point 1 on body 1 is opposite 
point 3 on body 2 (since both move one unit in opposite directions). So we have: 
Time=1  Time=2
Body 1  1, 2, 3 (moving to right) Body 1  1, 2, 3
Body 2  1, 2, 3 (moving to left ) Body 2 1, 2, 3
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Th e problem thus is: what happened to the intermediate state where 1 on body 1 is 
opposite 2 on body 2? Th ere is no intermediate time to fi t it onto, because Time =2 
is the very next time aft er Time=1. And yet surely the system must have gone 
through the intermediate state to get to where it is at Time =2. 
Th e solution recommended by Grunbaum (1967:109–114) can be stated as 
another Principle:
Principle 5
In motion in discrete time, some intermediate descriptions are not realized as 
events. 
In essence, he is saying that the conclusion of the Zeno argument, that appar-
ently possible state-descriptions do not occur in discrete time, is to be accepted. 
But he stresses, contrary to Zeno, that this is in no way an a priori objection to 
discrete time. Th at seems right: discrete time does seem to be consistent (albeit 
empirically false). It is merely that, given the assumption of discrete time, one has 
to revise one’s view of which things actually occur, ie. become events. 
It is apparent that the paradoxes we have looked at so far are all tricky, and the 
various lessons to be learnt are subtle ones about space, time and motion. One 
even more troublesome is Th e Arrow.
8. Th e Arrow
Th e Arrow, especially as directed against motion in continuous space and time, 
really does give one pause. Freeze-frame the universe. Nothing is moving. Motion 
does not exist. How then could any number of non-existent motions add up to an 
existent motion?
Grunbaum approvingly quotes Russell’s solution (Russell, 1937:351). Motion, 
like distance, is relational. (It is essentially given by the fi rst and second derivatives 
of distance over time, ie. the limit of a series of quotients δx/δt.) Th us, as with 
Extension (Principle 3), it is a mistake to expect non-zero motion to accumulate 
from a series of nonexistent motions. 
But is it though? Both Russell and Grunbaum note a consequence for continu-
ous motion: motion is not a state of a body. Th at is, motion is not a property that 
it holds at a time, irregardless of other times. It is, rather, simply a matter of being 
in diff erent places at diff erent times, that is a relation between diff erent things and 
times. But is that right? 
Graham Priest (1987) argues that it is not right. Priest rejects what he calls the 
cinematic view of Russell. Instead he follows Hegel in postulating that motion is 
inherently contradictory. Th e details of this theory are complex, but let it be said 
that Priest supposes that the mark of motion is that a moving body inconsistently 
occupies a lozenge of space, where the body is inconsistently both at and not-at 
all the points in the lozenge. Th e Th eory of Inconsistency has by now developed 
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suffi  ciently to take on board that this theory of motion as at least possible. More 
than that, it is diffi  cult not to feel sympathy with Hegel and Priest. If motion at any 
instant is non-existent, then how could motion occur, if its motion does not exist 
at every point? For further discussion, see Mortensen (2002). 
I do not pretend that this is a settled matter. To the contrary, it is further cause 
for celebration of Zeno’s penetrating vision, that the puzzle survives unresolved 
aft er 2,500 years. For the same reason, I hesitate to erect a further principle to 
be learned from our discussion of Th e Arrow. Motion at least involves relations 
between bodies, positions and times, but it might be more than that. Th e matter is 
unresolved at present. 
9. Place and Th e Millet Seed 
I will be briefer with these two paradoxes. Th e paradox of Place, which is directed 
at both continuous and discrete theories of space, looks like it derives an infi nite 
regress from the premisses. (1) Whatever exists, exists at a place (or point in spa-
ce). (2) Points of space exist. So, (3) points of space exist at points of space. (Place 
exists at a place, which exists at a place, ...ad infi nitum.) Th e simplest solution would 
seem to be to deny the fi rst premiss, that whatever exists, exists at a place. We 
could say that this holds for anything other than the existing points of space. Lest 
this move sound a little ad hoc, let it be said that the exception is justifi ed because 
points of space, rather than existing at places, constitute the standard of place. 
On the other hand, Th e Millet Seed has been underestimated, I think. It poses 
a signifi cant question in cognitive science: how can threshold eff ects in conscious-
ness occur? How can a number of not-noticeable diff erences make up a noticeable 
diff erence? It is the same problem as the so-called colour Sorites problem. We are 
all familiar with the experience of seeing three colours such that A is indistin-
guishable from B and B is indistinguishable from C, but A and C can defi nitely 
be distinguished. How is this possible? Th e Millet Seed is essentially the same, I 
suggest, but transposed into auditory experiences. Somehow a number of non-
existent experiences are made into an existent experience.
Now the brute fact that it does occur should reassure us that it is possible. 
And the way it was just stated suggests that it is a problem for how we distin-
guish experiences, that is mental states. (Th ere is, of course, a more general Sorites 
paradox, but that is somewhat diff erent, and not due to Zeno but to Eubulides.) 
Beyond that, I think that there is an interesting issue raised here of what it means 
to be present to consciousness. Th ere is, of course, the electrical phenomenon of a 
threshold eff ect, for example as exhibited by a capacitor. Th is must have something 
to do with the physical explanation, but it still does not quite get to the residual 
worry or how mental states, whose essence it is to be conscious, can have mental 
aspects which are somehow beneath consciousness. Th is can be stated as a fi nal 
principle. First, a defi nition: to say that a relation R is transitive is to say that (for 
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any X,Y, and Z) if X bears R to Y and Y bears R to Z, then X bears R to Z. (As an 
example of a transitive relation R, let R = “taller than”; that is, if X is taller than Y 
and Y is taller than Z then X is taller than Z.) Th en we can say of Th e Millet Seed: 
Principle 6
Indistinguishability is not a transitive relation.
But this is more to pose the problem of how this interesting fact can be so, than 
it is to solve it.
I do not mean to say that Th e Millet Seed has consequences which are as pro-
found as Th e Arrow. I think that it is an interesting problem, to be sure, but one 
within the theory of consciousness rather than metaphysics. Nonetheless, if Zeno 
really thought up this clever paradox too, then it is just more tribute to his bril-
liance and ingenuity. For a further discussion, see Gregory Vlastos (1967). 
10. Conclusion
We have seen what I believe are the strongest and most sophisticated versions of 
Zeno’s paradoxes around. We have also seen that we can take away with us several 
interesting principles, which were not appreciated for more than two millennia. 
Finally, we have seen that some of the issues remain unresolved. I take it that this 
constitutes a vindication of Russell’s high opinion of Zeno, as promised in the 
Introduction. 
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